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We are living through a period in which international aviation rules
must change. Privatization, competition, and globalization are trends
fueled by economic and political forces that will ultimately prevail. Gov-
ernments and airlines that embrace these trends will far outpace those
that do not. The U.S. government will be among those that embrace the
future.'
I. THE PROBLEM
A TRULY GLOBALIZED airline industry would be a market-
place that is not fragmented by national boundaries, where
airlines make decisions on the provision and price of services
according to market conditions, and where common competi-
tion, ownership, control, and safety regulations apply. To a con-
siderable extent these conditions reflect the long-standing
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policy objectives of the U.S. government. However, in 2007, for
the first time in sixty-three years, U.S. support for liberalization
seemed to be weakening as it rejected the European Union's
(E.U.) proposal for a transatlantic Open Aviation Area (OAA),
which would have embraced both markets. 2 That rejection was
ripe with irony as the United States had, for decades, berated
the Europeans for subsidizing and protecting their airlines.
This study examines U.S. civil aviation policy and explains the
limits on its version of a liberal market, limits that set the United
States at odds with globalization trends and the claims of its own
1995 policy statement.4 For the time being, the United States is
not embracing the future.
II. THE CONTEXT
Civil aviation has operated at the interface of economics and
politics since the establishment of national sovereignty over air
space in 1919. 5 With civil aviation complicated by aspects of se-
curity, national prestige, safety, and public service factors, the
result in the inter-war period was a highly predatory series of
bilateral air service agreements (ASAs). The ASAs created an
environment where the strong exploited the weak and political
considerations infected the airline system with a plethora of self-
serving government regulations.6 During the Second World
War, when the United States began to plan for a more liberal
regime, the problem it had to confront was how to cut, or at
least loosen the Gordian knot that tied sovereignty to the airline
industry. If this problem was not addressed, the marketplace
would remain fragmented, and the playing field competitively
uneven. Despite this realization, government would continue-
arbitrarily it seemed in commercial terms-to control prices, to
insist on cabotage (the reservation of domestic flights for its own
national airlines), to restrict market entry, frequency, and capac-
2 ALAN P. DOBSON, GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN AVIATION MARKET 169-89
(2007).
3 See ALAN P. DOBSON, FLYING IN THE FACE OF COMPETITION: THE POLICIES AND
DIPLOMACY OF AIRLINE REGULATORY REFORM IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 1968-94 221-235 (1995).
4 See Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60
Fed. Reg. at 21,845.
5 See generally Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct.
13, 1919, available at http://www.aviation.go.th/airtrans/airlaw/1914.html.
6 See generally International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, 171
U.N.T.S. 387.
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ity of flights, and to insist on national ownership and control of
airlines.
From 1944 to 2003, the United States applied four successive
strategies to try to loosen the Gordian knot and create a more
open and competitive international civil aviation system. This
was not altruism. The United States has a highly competitive
airline industry, and there were profits to be made in the inter-
national marketplace. However, U.S. policy-makers also be-
lieved that other countries' airlines would benefit as well and,
equally importantly, consumers would receive better, more effi-
cient, and cheaper services. These were the factors that drove
U.S. policy.7
A. THE CHICAGO STRATEGY: 1944
President Franklin D. Roosevelt drew the outline of a post-war
international civil aviation industry and he had in mind the
body of law brought into existence by Hugo Grotius' famous es-
say on the freedom of the seas and hoped to transpose that doc-
trine into the field of air communication.8 He wanted
arrangements by which planes of one country could enter any
other country for the purpose of discharging traffic of foreign
origin and accepting foreign bound traffic. 9 This radical vision
was presented to the Chicago International Civil Aviation Con-
ference in 1944.1o
The American position was based on three broad principles
and what came to be known as the five freedoms of the air. The
first principle was that airlines granted rights to fly between
countries X and Y would have to be owned and controlled by
countries X and Y."' This national ownership and control prin-
ciple was more or less universally applied until the EU invented
the concept of community carriers in the 1990s.12 The second
principle was that airlines should be free to offer whatever ser-
7 See DOBSON, supra note 3, at 147-78.
8 Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Berle Papers, Box 169, Articles
and Book Reviews 1964-67, folder Articles and Book Reviews 1965, The Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Treaties Twenty Years Later, Columbia University (Mar. 1965).
9 Memorandum of Conversation by Adolf A. Berle, Dep't of State, U.S. Nat'l
Archives, File No. 800.796/495, Nov. 11, 1943.
10 See ALAN P. DOBSON, PEACEFUL AIR WARFARE: THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN
AND THE POLrTICS OF INTERNATIONAL AVIATION ch. 5 (1991).
11 Air Services Agreement, U.S. - U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinaf-
ter Bermuda Agreement].
12 Scandanavian Airline Systems (SAS) might also be seen as a kind of commu-
nity carrier as it was owned and operated by more than one country.
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vices they wanted between designated international gateways:
there should be no pre-determination of capacity and fre-
quency.13 In 1944, for example, round-trip flights from the
United States to the United Kingdom (U.K.) were limited to two
per week for the airlines of each country.' 4 For Americans, this
seemed to unduly constrict the market and they wanted provi-
sions for escalation of capacity if demand justified it. Thirdly,
contrary to commonly held views, the United States rejected the
idea of unfettered price competition in favor of some form of
price stability.'5 As for the five freedoms, they provided for: (i)
innocent passage or over-flight; (ii) technical stops for repairs or
refueling; (iii) the right to pick up passengers from an airline's
country of origin and disembark them in the territory of the
other contracting party; (iv) the right to pick up passengers in
the other contracting country and disembark them in the air-
line's country of origin; and (v) the right to pick up passengers
from the other contracting party and carry them forward to a
third party destination. 16 The United States tried to get these
freedoms accepted multilaterally, though it was recognized that
the five freedoms were highly controversial and that the extent
to which they would be granted would depend on bilateral
discussions.
At Chicago, largely because of British opposition out of fear
that the United States would dominate international services,
the Americans were unable to persuade the conference to adopt
the commercially important third, fourth, and fifth freedoms.17
Consequently, a new commercial regime did not emerge from
Chicago.' 8 The first U.S. strategy had failed; it now turned to a
different one to get what it wanted.
13 See Bermuda Agreement, supra note 11, at annex.
14 See DoBsoN, supra note 10, at 11-124.
1-5 Id. at ch. 6.
16 Int'l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Freedoms of the Air, http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/trivia/freedoms_air.html. Other rights, which later became significant
under a more liberal dispensation, are: (vi) the right to pick up "gateway" passen-
gers in a foreign state and bring them to the airline's country of origin for trans-
fer to another flight with a foreign destination; (vii) the right to commercial
carriage between two states, neither of which is the airline's country of origin;
and (viii) cabotage. Id. These rights became of particular importance in the
OAA negotiations.
17 DOBsoN, supra note 10, at ch. 5.
I8 See generally id. at 125-72; Mark L.J. Dierikx, Shaping World Aviation: Anglo-
American Civil Aviation Relations, 1944-1946, 57 J. AIR L. & COMM. 795 (1992);
David Mackenzie, The Bermuda Conference and Anglo-American Aviation Relations at
the End of the Second World War, 12J. TRANSP. HIST. 61 (1991).
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B. THE "BERMUDA MODEL" STRATEGY: 1946-1977
The main target for the United States after Chicago was the
U.K because it controlled, directly or through client states, so
much of the world.'" Without a modus operandi with the British,
there would be great difficulty, if not an impossibility, in devel-
oping the international airline market in a way that would de-
liver something resembling what the United States wanted. In
1946, the two parties met on the island of Bermuda to negotiate
an ASA.20 The Bermuda Agreement, as it became universally
known, was dictated by the Americans who played on the British
post-war need for reconstruction funding to extract from them
terms that were highly favorable to the United States.2 These
terms allowed U.S. airlines to exploit the world market more
easily. The Bermuda Agreement provided for airlines "substan-
tially" owned and controlled by either state to operate on a basis
of "fair and equal opportunity" through the exchange of the five
freedoms and at prices fixed through International Air Trans-
portation Association (LATA) tariff conferences.22 IATA was and
is a cartel of the major scheduled airlines. 23 The pricing recom-
mendations resulting from these conferences were routinely ap-
proved by governments and, in the case of the United States,
granted anti-trust immunity.24
The Americans at Chicago had sought a multilateral agree-
ment on the commercial elements of aviation, but failed. What
they then did was to hold up the Bermuda Agreement as a
model that others should follow. This could not replace the ho-
mogeneity that a multilateral agreement would have provided,
but at least it brought some uniformity and order to the system.
Under the Bermuda Agreement, fares were fixed by the IATA.
25
Airports had to be designated as international gateways and the
frequency of operations had to be agreed upon.26 Capacity was
supposed to be liberal in that it was to be determined by airlines
19 See generally DOBSON, supra note 10, at 174-98.
20 Mackenzie, supra note 18, at 63.
21 Id. at 67.
22 Bermuda Agreement, supra note 11.
23 See generally DOBSON, supranote 10, at 174.
24 See Dustin Appel, Comment, Fuel Surcharges and Tacit Collusion Under the Sher-
man Act: What Good is Catching a Few Bad Guys if Consumers Still Get Robbed?, 73 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 375, 394 (2008).
25 Bermuda Agreement, supra note 11.
26 Id.
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to meet whatever demand arose.27 At least this moved away
from the principle of predetermined capacity levels. Strictly
speaking, only ex post facto adjustments were allowed after it
could be shown that there was over-capacity or that one side was
unduly damaging the other's operations. But, in fact, if either
government objected to the capacity being flown by the other's
airlines, there was great potential for dispute.21 Clearly this no-
tionally liberal regime, which the United States urged the rest of
the world to adopt, was open to interpretation and some ana-
lysts believe that any bilateral system has a tendency toward con-
servatism and protectionism. 29 However, the United States had
such a dominant position in the early post-war years that, when
it was a party to a bilateral agreement, it was able to extract lib-
eral provisions from its partners." In such cases, the Bermuda
Agreement meant something, but elsewhere when the United
States was not party to an agreement, the model was distorted
and the regime favored by the United States was compro-
mised." What happened to Bermuda-type agreements accord-
ing to one highly experienced airline official was that "airlines
and governments sat down and said whatever this agreement
[the Bermuda Agreement] meant to say we aren't going to let
you do more than we want to do. '3 2 In Europe, this translated
into a highly regulated and protected market where foreign
routes were largely limited to capital cities, capacity was divided
between state-owned carriers operating under a near universal
single designation regime, and revenue was pooled and then di-
vided up among the state-owned carriers. 3 Nevertheless, the
United States benefited greatly from the Bermuda Agreement
and from its own power and influence to get the kind of ASAs
that it wanted. In addition, notwithstanding the protectionism
found in arrangements to which the United States was not a
27 Id.
28 See ALAN P. DOBSON, FDR and the Struggle for a Post-War Civil Aviation Regime:
Legacy or Loss?, in FDR's WORLD: WAR, PEACE, AND LEGACIES 194-213 (David
Woolner et al. eds., 2008).
29 H.A. Raben, Deregulation: a Critical Interrogation, in INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, (H.A. Wassenbergh & H.P. van Fenema eds.,
1981).
30 DOBSON, supra note 10, at ch. 6.
31 See DOBSON, supra note 2, at 6.
32 Interview with Robert Ebdon, Head of Gov't Affairs, British Airways (Aug. 5,
1991).
33 See generally Bermuda Agreement, supra note 11.
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party, the overall system was still much more liberal than the
dispensation that had prevailed in the inter-war years.
C. THE DEREGULATION AND LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY:
1977-1992
For thirty years, the United States remained content with this
more liberal regime, but then, in the 1970s, new and more radi-
cal ideas arose. By the mid 1970s, new economic theory was
emerging, particularly from the Chicago School in the United
States, that challenged the conventional wisdom of Keynesian-
ism and the idea that regulating industries, like civil aviation,
was necessary for public and consumer interests.3" No one really
knew what the net effects on a large airline market would be if it
were to be deregulated, but once Jimmy Carter became presi-
dent in 1977, people soon found out.1
5
In his first message to Congress on March 4, 1977, President
Carter capitalized on the impact that Senator Edward Kennedy
made with high profile hearings in the U.S. Senate on the possi-
ble consequences of deregulation and announced that one of
his main goals was to free the American people from the burden
of over-regulation. He urged the Congress to reduce federal
regulation of the domestic commercial airline industry.36 It
took nearly two years before the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act
became law,37 but when it did its effects reverberated across the
Atlantic and around the world. Its impact grew both because of
further political action taken by the United States and because
of market dynamics, which came into play during the first phase
of U.S. domestic deregulation. Competitive forces began to
seep into the international terrain just as the Carter Administra-
tion turned its attention to developing strategy for dealing with
the overseas marketplace. The 1978 U.S. government policy
statement argued that the guiding principle of United States avi-
ation negotiating policy should be to trade competitive opportu-
nities, rather than restrictions, in negotiations. It went on to
assert that the United States should aggressively pursue its own
interests in expanding air transportation and reducing prices
34 See generally M. Feldstein, The Retreat from Keynesian Economics, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, Summer 1981, at 92.
35 See DOBSON, supra note 3, at 149-50.
36 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Staff Offices, Domestic Policy Staff, Eizen-
stat box 148, folder: Aviation Airline Regulatory Reform, Message to Congress
Mar. 4, 1977, attached to Eizenstat to Carter, Feb. 22, 1977.
37 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1978).
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rather than accepting the self-defeating accommodation of pro-
tectionism. Concessions in negotiations should only be given in
return for progress toward competitive objectives, and those
concessions themselves should be of a liberalizing character.3"
Some of this was so liberal that it seemed like folly to
America's established international carriers such as Pan Ameri-
can World Airways and Trans World Airlines. In response,
partly because of their lobbying and partly because of broader
political concerns, members of Congress passed the Interna-
tional Air Transportation Competition Act in 1979 to try to rein
in the Administration and ensure that ASAs were more clearly in
America's immediate interests.3 1 Congress placed more empha-
sis on equal benefits and tried to ensure that infatuation with
liberalization did not blind the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion and the Carter Administration to the dangers of imbalance
in ASAs that would disadvantage U.S. airlines: they might cede
market opportunities without commensurate reciprocation.4"
The Act specified that the United States should only grant ac-
cess to the U.S. domestic market in return for "benefits of a simi-
lar magnitude for U.S. carriers or the traveling public with
permanent linkage between rights granted and rights given
away."'" There was also an admonition that there should be a:
strengthening of the competitive position of United States carri-
ers to at least assure equality with foreign carriers, including the
attainment of opportunities for United States air carriers to
maintain and increase their profitability, in foreign air
transportation.42
Even so, liberal ASAs have been pursued by U.S. administra-
tions with varying degrees of vigor ever since. By 1980, a dozen
had been renegotiated. While most were with fairly insignificant
players, agreements with Holland, Belgium, and West Germany,
all concluded in 1978, were to have important consequences for
spreading competition and stimulating change in the sclerotic
38 See DOBSON, supra note 3, at 149-50 (citing Jimmy Carter Presidential Li-
brary, WHCF, subject file, box CA-l, folder: 9/1/78-12/31/78, U.S. Policy for the
Conduct of International Air Transportation Negotiations, Aug. 21, 1978).
39 Interview with Jeffrey N. Shane, former Undersecretary for Policy, U.S. De-
partment of Transportation, Mar. 13, 2008 (on file with author).
40 Id.
41 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192
§ 1300, 94 Stat. 35 (1980).
42 Id.
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European aviation market.43 This was the first and most endur-
ing of American strategies to deregulate the international mar-
ketplace; the second was a Show Cause Order (SCO)
promulgated by Alfred Kahn, Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the industry regulator in the United States.44
Since IATA began its tariff conferences to fix air fares in 1945,
its recommendations had regularly received approval from the
U.S. CAB. This was vital because as the CAB approved, it also
granted the airlines immunity from U.S. antitrust laws, which
would otherwise have prohibited this cartel-style operation.46
With Kahn at the CAB, things changed. On June 9, 1978, the
CAB suggested that IATA fare setting might not be in the public
interest and thus would not warrant antitrust immunity.47 It is-
sued a SCO requiring IATA to justify its current practices a.4  The
SCO provoked international outrage. It was seen as the worst
type of American unilateralism and as an attempt by the CAB to
stop inter-airline fare agreements and destroy LATA's role as a
fare coordinator.4 9 The SCO did not destroy the IATA but, over
the following years, its fare-setting role was increasingly dimin-
ished. The SCO specifically helped to push the Europeans into
a more competitive transatlantic price regime in 1982, negoti-
ated under the auspices of the European Civil Aviation Confer-
ence (ECAC) and the U.S. State and Transportation
Departments.5" Regulation was at least beginning to give way to
some price competition.
Acting in tandem with U.S. liberalization strategies were mar-
ket forces, some preceding the legal and institutional moves for
reform, others released and nurtured by them. The conven-
tional wisdom was that economies of scale could not be reaped
by airlines."' An airline could get bigger and possibly make
more overall profit, but on a pro rata basis, profit margins would
remain constant, or would more likely decline, as larger opera-
tions meant more management difficulties. 52 These assump-
tions were about to be destroyed.
43 See DOBSON, supra note 2, at 22-28.





49 CAB Order No. 78-6-78, June 12, 1978.
50 ECAC is the European sister organization to ICAO.
5' Interview with Cyril Murphy, Vice President United Airlines, July 1, 1991.
52 Id.
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What was discovered were economies of scale . . ., that is, you
organized your system in such a way that you were able to consol-
idate large amounts of traffic at a point and then redistribute
that traffic. For each unit ... that you flew, if you had ... higher
load factors on that piece of equipment; in effect you had a more
productive piece of equipment-a more productive unit of
production.53
This was the hub-and-spoke configuration of routes.5 4 As U.S.
government policy pursued liberal, bilateral ASAs, which
opened up more and more U.S. international gateways based on
the old domestic carriers' hubs, American Airlines (AA), United
Airlines (UA), and Delta carried all before them. 55 Well posi-
tioned through their inter-connected hubs and their vast num-
ber of feeder spokes to assemble large numbers of passengers,
there seemed an irresistible logic that the traditional domestic
operators should now use their dominance over the U.S. domes-
tic market, approximately forty percent of the entire world civil
aviation market,56 to thrust out their spokes into the interna-
tional sphere, and that is precisely what they did. This destroyed
U.S. traditional overseas carriers, which did not have well-devel-
oped U.S. domestic networks to feed passengers into their inter-
national gateways.5 7 All of a sudden, the civil aviation system was
changing rapidly and newly unleashed competition was having
major impact. Among other things, this unsettled many airlines
and some governments in Europe and prompted more intense
thinking there about liberalization.5"
There were doubts and hesitations about deregulation in the
United States, and opposition from both the vested interests of
the established U.S. international carriers and naturally protec-
53 Id.
54 Id.; see also Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid
to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 374-76 (2003).
55 See Gabriel S. Meyer, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight Path toward Open
Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 434 (2002).
56 Barry James, Gingerly, EU and US Move toward Open Skies, HERALD TRIBUNE,
Sept. 2, 1996.
57 Interview with Cyril Murphy, supra note 51.
58 For the story of changes in Europe, see DOBSON, supra note 2. The new con-
figuration of operation-hub and spoke-would not have been possible without
a quantum leap forward in the technology of computers. By the mid 1980s, the
major computer reservation systems could 'juggle one hundred million fares at a
single time." See B.S. PETERSON, BLUESTREAK: INSIDE JETBLUE, THE UPSTART THAT
RocKED THE INDUSTRY 101 (2004).
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tionist segments of the U.S. Congress were forceful.5" The Rea-
gan Administration was initially cautious,6" but the changes that
reform brought about seemed overwhelmingly positive for U.S.
airlines generally and for the traveling public. By 1990, U.S. air-
lines carried twice as many international passengers as they had
in 1980, increasing their market share by 20%; and routes prolif-
erated and capacity and frequency grew apace.6 By the early
1990s, it now seemed right to capitalize on these gains and re-
new the drive for even more liberalization.
D. THE OPEN-SKIES STRATEGY: 1992-2008
"Open-skies" meant free pricing, open routes and destina-
tions, and unrestricted third, fourth, and fifth freedom rights.62
It also offered antitrust immunity to approved international air-
line alliances as one of the main inducements for other coun-
tries to enter agreements. 63 Antitrust-immunized alliances
provided better access to the U.S. market. Such alliances over-
came many of the artificial obstacles to a globalized marketplace
that had arisen because of the issue of sovereignty over air
space. Alliances provided better access to feeder services and
onward distribution flights to and from major international
gateways than anything the traditional freedom rights could of-
fer.64 They allowed the domestic and regional operations of one
partner to distribute and assemble passengers in connection
with the long-haul operations of the other on a reciprocal basis
through code-sharing agreements or by otherwise dovetailing
their operations with their partners.65 These services were oth-
erwise prohibited by cabotage, by the absence of fifth freedom
rights, or by the fact that the other partner could not operate
them profitably.66
The United States had great success with open-skies agree-
ments. It negotiated the first with the Netherlands in 1992, but
59 Jeffrey N. Shane, Undersecretary for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Air Trans-




62 Mark J. Andrews et al., International Transportation Law, 42 INT'L LAW. 631,
644 (2007).
63 James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition, 45
Hous. L. REv. 293, 302 (2008).
64 See id. at 305.
65 Id. at 299.
66 DOBSON, supra note 58, at 160-63.
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many more followed over the years as liberalization took hold in
Europe.6" The European Commission, capitalizing on pro-com-
petition decisions by the European Court ofJustice and working
closely with the U.K. and the Netherlands, pushed through a
three-stage package of reform that culminated in the creation of
the single European aviation market.6" By 2002, of the twenty-
five E.U. member states, fifteen had open-skies agreements with
the United States. 69 Once again, the United States was leading
the world airline system forward to lower cost flights delivered in
a more seamless and efficient way through code-sharing, com-
bined marketing, and frequent-flyer programs.7v The interna-
tional airline regime was closer than ever to a globalized
marketplace that operated largely on commercial lines.
However, problems abided. Some were specific: for example,
the 1977 Bermuda 2 ASA between the U.K and the United
States, and its partial re-negotiation in 1980, restricted the
United States to two carriers operating into Heathrow, the larg-
est international hub in the world.71 This provoked outrage
over the years in the United States, which determined it had to
obtain freer access.7 2 But the story is not all one-sided: the
United States, for all its championing of liberalization, had sev-
eral measures in place which annoyed its civil aviation partners
and led to charges of hypocrisy.71 Even after deregulation, there
was never a free U.S. aviation market. U.S. airlines in difficulties
are allowed Chapter 11 protection, under which they can oper-
ate under favorable terms while seeking to regain financial via-
bility.74 The U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) allows the U.S.
67 Shane, supra note 59.
68 Package 1: Council Directive 87/601/EEC, 1987 O.J. L 374; Council Deci-
sion 87/602/EEC, 1987 O.J. L 374; Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 O.J. L 374;
Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 O.J. L 374; Package 2: Council Regulation
2342/90, 1990 O.J. L 217; Council Regulation 2343/90, 1990 O.J. L 217; Package
3: Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. L 240; Council Regulation 2408/92,
1992 O.J. L 240; Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. L 240.
69 U. S. Dep't of State, List of Open Skies Agreements Through October 2002, http://
www.state.gov/e/eeb/ris/fs/1441.htm (Aug. 15, 2009).
70 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Office of the Secretary, International Aviation Develop-
ments, Second Report, Transatlantic Deregulation: the Alliance Network Effect 4-5 (2000).
71 Air Transport Services, U.S.-U.K, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367.
72 Alan P. Dobson, The USA, Hegemony and Airline Market Access to Britain and
Western Europe, 1945-96, in DWLOMACY AND STONECRAFr 129-59 (1998).
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Chapter I Ifor Delta, Northwest, CBSNEws.coM, Sept.14, 2005, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/14 / national/ main846524.sh tml?tag=con-
ten tMain;contentBody.
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government, in times of crisis, to call upon U.S. civil airlines for
up-lift capacity to transport troops abroad and, in return, the Fly
America Act reserves all official government air travel for U.S.
airlines.75 The United States has also traditionally prohibited
wet leasing of foreign aircraft, i.e., aircraft supplied with their
own foreign crews.76 However, all these rather specific matters
pale to insignificance when set against U.S. cabotage and owner-
ship-and-control laws, which restrict foreign access to the U.S.
market. Of course, cabotage and ownership-and-control laws
apply to all other countries as well, but this is such a significant
issue regarding the U.S. domestic airline market because it is so
huge, amounting to 35-40% of the entire world airline
market.77
This was the state of play in the international airline system
and in the development of U.S. policy when the E.U. brought
about a crisis that forced the United States and the E.U. to
speedily assemble for negotiations. In those negotiations, the
E.U. tabled proposals that would have created a single aviation
market for the United States and the E.U. and provided a tem-
plate for the rest of the world to follow them in moving swiftly to
a truly single, globalized civil aviation market.78 The E.U. was
willing to change things regarding cabotage and ownership-and-
control, but the United States, notwithstanding all the liberal
policies that it had nurtured over the years, baulked at this.79
III. THE POSSIBILITY OF A TRANSATLANTIC
OPEN AVIATION AREA80
Negotiation of the U.S.-E.U. Air Transport Agreement was
made necessary by a 2002 European Court of Justice ruling that
the bilateral open-skies agreements between European Union
countries and the United States were contrary to Community
75 Government-Financed Air Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 40118 (2000 & Supp.
V).
76 See Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy
into the Jet Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143, n. 121 (1994).
77 James, supra note 56.
78 DOBSON, supra note 2, at 166-85.
79 Id.
80 Much of this section is based on interviews conducted by the authors, Alan
P. Dobson and Joseph A. McKinney, on March 11 and 12, 2008 with Paul Gretch,
U.S. Department of Transportation; Will Ris, Vice President for Government
Affairs American Airlines; Rebecca Cox, Vice President for Government Affairs
Continental Airlines; and Jeffrey Shane recently retired from the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
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law.81 Between 1987 and 1997, through a series of reforms, a
single European aviation market had been created among the
E.U. member countries.8 2 These reforms removed restrictions
among the E.U. countries on the provision of air services, pro-
vided for harmonization of aviation regulations, and invented
the concept of community as opposed to national carriers."3
There were no longer to be national but community ownership-
and-control laws.8 4 The European Commission considered bi-
lateral open-skies agreements to be inconsistent with community
law (because they recognized the concept of national rather
than community carriers) and also inconsistent with the spirit of
a unified E.U. market, because they granted some member
states commercial operating rights to the United States which
were unavailable to others.8 5 Consequently, the Commission
brought suit at the Court of Justice against eight member coun-
tries challenging the legality of their bilateral ASAs with the
United States. 6 The Court of Justice ruled that the "nationality
clauses" of the bilateral agreements were a violation of commu-
nity law.8 7 This threatened turmoil in the transatlantic aviation
market.
The Commission had long harbored the desire for sole com-
petency to negotiate with outside countries concerning aviation
services, but the Court of Justice, realizing the politically explo-
sive nature of the issue, instead gave the Commission shared
competency with the member states to negotiate such agree-
ments."8 Negotiations with the United States for an ASA with
the E.U. to supersede the numerous bilateral agreements with
member state countries began in June 2003.9
From the time of the Second World War, as we have seen, the
United States had been the demander for open markets and for
increased competition in the provision of aviation services. This
81 Joined cases C-466, C-467, C-468, C-471, 0-472, C-475 & C-476/98, Comm'n
v. U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09427.
82 See generally DOBSON, supra note 2, at 82-148.
83 Id. at 148.
84 Id. at 175-78.
85 Id. at 174-75.
86 Id. at 174.
87 See Communication from the Commission on the Consequences of the
Court Judgments of 5 November 2002 for European Air Transport Policy, at
§ 2.2, corn (2002) 649 final (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=com:2002:649:FIN:EN:PDF.
88 See generally DOBSON, supra note 2, at 175.
89 Id. 178.
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was particularly the case after the U.S. airline industry was der-
egulated beginning in the late 1970s. However, in the most re-
cent negotiations the tables were turned. The E.U. came to the
negotiations proposing an OAA that would have provided for
deep integration of the U.S. and E.U. markets for air services.9 0
A major E.U. goal, and a necessary one in view of the Court of
Justice decision, was that the United States recognize E.U. air-
lines as community carriers.9 This would mean freedom for air-
lines of any E.U. country to begin airline service from any point
in the E.U. to any point in the United States.92 The E.U. also
proposed that E.U. and U.S. cabotage should be merged, and
that restrictions on foreign ownership be removed, so that merg-
ers of E.U. and U.S. airlines were not hindered. 3 Finally, the
E.U. envisioned harmonization of competition and safety regu-
lations so as to attain a fully integrated market.94 In preparing
the ground for the talks, the E.U. commissioned the U.S.-based
Brattle Group to analyze the economic effects of an OAA.15 Its
findings seemed to epitomize the kind of benefits to be reaped
from liberalization which the United States had sought for so
many decades:
* Annual transatlantic passenger numbers would increase
from 4 million to 11 million, meaning transatlantic travel as
a percentage of total global air travel would increase by 9%
to 24%;
* Intra-E.U. air travel would also increase significantly, to 35.7
million passengers per year, an increase of 13.6 million;
* Consumer benefits of $5.2 billion would be created annu-
ally as a direct result of increased competition, lower fares,
and increased passenger numbers;
" Directly related industries would experience an increase in
economic output of $3.6 billion per year, taking the total to
$8.1 billion per year.9
90 Id.
91 Id. at 179.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 178.
94 Id.
95 Boaz Moselle et al., The Brattle Group, The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open
Aviation Area (2002), available at www.brattle.com/_documents/Publications/Ar-
ticleReport2198.pdf. I would like to acknowledge a debt to one of my postgradu-
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The question was, would the Americans stay true to their long-
standing position of demanding the lifting of regulations in or-
der to release the dynamics of the marketplace, or would their
liberalism give way to the forces of economic protectionism,
partly informed by what many saw as spurious political and se-
curity concerns?
The OAA was politically much farther than the United States
was prepared to go.97 There was little resistance to the concept
of community carriers, so the United States conceded on this
point early in the negotiations.98 After all, because the Court of
Justice had ruled that bilateral agreements with nationality
clauses violated community law,99 recognition of the concept of
community carriers, in the end, probably could not be avoided
without chaos in the industry. Furthermore, there was little op-
position to the concept on the part of U.S. airlines or any of the
interest groups associated therewith. While it was recognized
that there would be increased competition on certain transatlan-
tic routes, the U.S. companies were in a relatively strong posi-
tion and did not consider this prospect a serious threat.10
On the issues of cabotage and relaxation of foreign ownership
limitations, however, the political equation was entirely differ-
ent. The U.K. had for many years insisted that if the United
States wanted more competitive airline markets, then competi-
tion must not stop at the water's edge, meaning that the United
States must allow cabotage rights to foreign carriers and also al-
low foreign ownership of airlines.' 01 The U.K demand was
widely interpreted as intentionally setting hurdles which it knew
were politically impossible to jump in order to avoid conceding
increased access to Heathrow Airport.10 2
In the negotiations for the U.S.-E.U. Air Transport Agree-
ment, strong opposition by U.S. airline industry labor organiza-
tions made cabotage essentially a dead issue from the start.
British Airlines and Virgin Atlantic continued to push for cabo-
97 See generally DOBSON, supra note 2, at 175..
98 Id. at 178-79.
99 Id. at 175.
100 Id. at 178-84 (For example, instead of only Lufthansa being able to fly from
German international gateways to the U.S., every other community airline would
now be able to as well).
10, Mirjam Kars & Helen Stout, Open Skies and Hidden Agendas: The Case of
the Open Skies Treaty from the Perspective of Strategic Behaviour (draft pre-
pared for Third Pan-European European Conf., Sept. 21, 2006) available at http:/
/www.jhubc.it/ecpr-istanbul/virtualpaperroom/026.pdf.
102 Id. at 17.
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tage, however, as a strategy in the view of some for preventing
consummation of an agreement that would open access to
Heathrow.10 For most airlines, cabotage is not as important an
issue as one might think, because alliances that have been given
antitrust immunity serve as an effective substitute for cabotage
in that alliance partners collect and distribute passengers in the
United States for E.U. airlines and in the EU for U.S. airlines."0 4
Even if cabotage rights were granted, it is unlikely that E.U. air-
lines would establish hubs in the United States because of the
great expense involved, and alliances already perform much the
same function. It is the opposition of labor and their allies and
protectionist factions within Congress that are the main
problems. 5
Foreign ownership and control of U.S. airlines is' also strongly
opposed by pilot and airline industry labor organizations. 10 6 In
addition, the issue is complicated by national security considera-
tions. The U.S. military possesses the right through CRAF to
make use of civilian aircraft to supplement its airlift capabilities
during times of hostilities. 10 7 There is some fear that, if airlines
in the United States came under foreign control, these rights
might be compromised, or at least the use of the aircraft could
become complicated by political considerations.0 8
The European Commission negotiators realized early that
cabotage was too sensitive politically to be dealt with in the first
stage of the negotiations. 10 9 They thus switched their attention
to ownership and control110 but also eventually realized that
103 Id. at 15.
104 See id. at 17.
105 Yu-Chun Chang & Chia-Jui Hsu, Open Skies or Open Aviation?, AERLINES
MAG., Nov. 2006, at 3, available at http://www.aerlines.nl/issue_34/34 YuChun_
ChangOpenSkiesOpenAviation/Area.pdf.
106 Policy Statement, AFL-CIO, A SOUND COURSE FOR U.S. INT'L AvIATION POL-
icy (Mar. 11, 2004), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ecO
3112004a.cfm.
107 United States Air Force, Fact Sheet: Civil Reserve Air Fleet, http://www.af.
mil/facLsheets/factsheet.asp?id=173 (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
108 A.L.C de Meshal & H. Bashar, International Air Transport Agreements and Re-
gionalism: The Impact of the European Union Upon the Development of International Air
Law, inJrAN MONNET/ROBERT SCHUMAN PAPER SERIES, July 2005, at 17 n.65.
10- US Market Access Grounds EU-US Air Traffic Talks, GuRAcTIV.COM, Apr. 8,
2004, http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/us-market-access-grounds-eu-us-
air-traffic-talks/article-i 12758.
110 Compare Press Release, Council of the E.U., 2589th Council Meet-
ing-Transp., Telecomm., & Energy, at 26 (June 10-11, 2004) (emphasizing cabo-
tage rights), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms-Data/docs/press
Data/en/trans/80931.pdf, with Press Release, Council of the E.U. 2654th Coun-
2009] 543
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
changes would be impossible during the election year of
2004.111 Consequently, they took to the Transport Ministers a
draft agreement in which the major concession of the United
States was recognition of the concept of community carriers.' 12
The E.U. Transport Council rejected this agreement as insuffi-
cient and sent the negotiators back to get some movement on
the matter of foreign ownership and control.11 They also
wanted to see concessions on wet leasing, the right of European
airlines to provide services to the U.S. military, and changes in
the Fly America Program." 4
U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta was furi-
ous11 5 and negotiations did not resume until late in 2005.116
During these negotiations, E.U. negotiators were surprised to re-
ceive signals that movement on the foreign ownership-and-con-
trol issue might be possible." 7 Mineta intimated that, while
changing the statute limiting foreign ownership and control of
airlines in the United States would not be possible, a reinterpre-
tation of the statute by the Department of Transportation could
provide some room for liberalization."' This gave what turned
out to be false hope to the E.U. negotiators that change with
regard to the foreign ownership-and-control issue might be
possible.
The U.S. Department of Transportation issued a notice of
proposed rule making (NPRM) that would, through executive
decree, change the interpretation of the statute that limited for-
eign ownership and control of U.S. airlines without having to
cil Meeting-Transp., Telecomm., & Energy, at 12 (Apr. 21, 2005) (highlighting
the issues of ownership and control), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
NewsWord/en/trans/84769.doc.
III Press Release, Council of the E.U., 2607th Council Meeting-Transp.,
Telecomm., & Energy (Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cmsData/docs/pressData/en/trans/82164.pdf.
112 Kars & Stout, supra note 101, at 7.
113 De Meshal & Basher, supra note 108, at 16.
114 Id.
115 DoBsoN, supra note 2, at 181-82.
116 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Statement of the U.S. Dep't of Transp.
on U.S.-E.U. Air Talks (Oct. 11, 2005), http://wv.dot.gov/affairs/dot15205.
htm.
117 See generally DOBSON, supra note 2, 179-83.
118 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Dep't of Transp. Proposal Would
Make it Easier for Airlines to Raise Money (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.dot.gov/
affairs/dot15805.htm. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Statement of
U.S. Transp. Sec'y Norman Y. Mineta on U.S.-E.U. Aviation Talks (Nov. 18,
2005), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot17105.htm.
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involve Congress.119 According to the terms of the NPRM, while
matters relating to safety, company documentation, and any as-
pects of national security would have to remain under control of
the American majority owners of an airline, on commercial mat-
ters, the minority shareholders could be given control. 120 Ap-
parently, some miscommunication and misunderstanding
occurred within the U.S. Department of Transportation con-
cerning whether this change of interpretation was feasible.
121
The negotiators were apparently basing their opinion on the
conviction that such an interpretation was possible. 122 The lan-
guage of the original statute concerning foreign ownership and
control could be construed more liberally. However, over the
years the statute had evolved through court decisions that then
had been incorporated by Congress into law in ways that would
have made the reinterpretation of the statute unable to with-
stand legal challenge. 123
In any case, the Department of Transportation failed to antici-
pate the firestorm of political opposition to the NPRM. Airline
labor unions and pilots' associations opposed the NPRM out of
fear that it could result in job losses. 124 Because of the influence
of their labor constituents, both Senator Daniel Inouye (D,
Haw.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence and Transportation, and Representative James Oberstar
(D, Minn.), Chairman of the House Transportation and Infra-
structure Committee, strongly opposed the measure. 25 The
personal friendship of Senator Inouye with Senator Ted Stevens
(R, Alaska), Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, assured that the Chairman
119 Actual Control of U.S. Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389, 67,389 (Nov. 7, 2005)
(codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 204 & 399 (2007)).
120 Id. at 67,394.
121 White House Warned on Airlines, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/30/20061130-100047-846r/
122 Id.
123 Id.; see also Interview with Rebecca Cox, Vice President for Government Af-
fairs, Continental Airlines (Mar. 11, 2008) (on file with author).
124 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, Timeline of Opposition to Foreign Control of
U.S. Airlines, http://www.ALPA Documents/ALPDocumentsView.aspx?itemid=
4505&moduleld=1316&tabid=256 (last visited Aug. 15, 2009); Transp. Trades
Dep't, AFL-CIO, DOT Proposed Changes on Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers
(Jan. 6, 2006), http://www.ttd.org.
125 A Letter from Edward Wytkind, President, Transp. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO,
to Jeffrey Shane, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (July 5, 2006) http://www.ttd.org (select
TTD Library from menu, then Federal Comments followed by 2006 comments).
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would have the Vice Chairman's support.126 Against such formi-
dable congressional opposition, the Department of Transporta-
tion did not have the status or clout to make the NPRM stick
without strong pressure from the White House. However, this
issue was not perceived as having high enough priority for the
President to expend political capital to ensure that the reinter-
pretation of the statute was maintained.1 27
Further complicating the issue was a conflagration of political
opposition that erupted in 2006 after a Dubai company, DP
Ports, purchased a British company, P&O, that was managing six
major U.S. ports and a number of smaller ones.128 U.S. Coast
Guard intelligence officials raised some concerns about the na-
tional security implications of having U.S. ports managed by a
Dubai firm, 29 and several U.S. politicians rose up in opposition
to having the Dubai firm manage the ports.1 30 Public opinion
was easily incited against the idea as well. 3 ' While the NPRM
was in no way related to the ports issue, those opposed to the
NPRM could in the prevailing climate easily argue that, on na-
tional security grounds, even the commercial aspects of U.S. air-
lines should not be under the control of foreigners.
In addition to all of these complications, Continental Airlines
came out strongly in opposition to the NPRM. 13 2 For Continen-
tal, the opposition was not based upon genuine opposition to
foreign ownership.133 Instead, its opposition was a strategic
ploy.1 34 Continental was not a member of an immunized alli-
ance, unlike a number of other American airlines such as
126 Tom Mays & Jesse J. Holland, Inouye Attests to Steven's Honesty, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct., 10, 2008 (noting Inouye and Steven's friendship).
127 Interview with Jeffrey N. Shane, supra note 39.
128 Rick Klein & Susan Milligan, Dubai Arm Opts Out of Ports Control Deal, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
washington/articles/2006/03/10/dubai-firm-opts-out of ports-controldeal.
129 Ted Barrett, Dana Bash & Ed Henry, Coast Guard Raised Concerns on Port
Deal, CNN.coM, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/politics/02/27/ports.
dubai/index.html.
130 Press Release, Congressman Chris Smith, Smith Co-Sponsors Legislation to
Block Dubai Ports World's Purchase of US Ports (Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with
author).
131 Rasmussen Reports, Just 17% Favor Dubai Ports Deal, Feb. 24, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publiccontent/current-events/other_
currentevents/just17 favordubai-ports-deal.
132 Press Release, Cont'l Airlines, Cont'l Airlines Says D.O.T. Proposal on For-
eign Control of U.S. Airlines Ignores Congress (Nov. 3, 2005), http://continen-
tal.com/web/en-US/apps/vendors/default.aspx?i=PRNEWS.
133 Interview with Jeffrey N. Shane, supra note 39.
134 Id.
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United.1 1 5 They would be able to juggle take-off and landing
slots at Heathrow Airport under a liberalized regime with their
alliance partners, but Continental could not, and would only be
able to get slots if it were possible to buy them.' 6 So Continen-
tal's real goal was to block progress in the negotiations until the
Department of Transportation applied pressure on some air-
lines to sell Continental landing slots at Heathrow. According
to European Commission rules, the trading of landing slots in a
secondary market is illegal.137 However, this policy has never
been enforced and slots have been regularly traded at Heathrow
and sanctioned by the British High Court. 3 Eventually, Conti-
nental was able to purchase slots at Heathrow, and it then
dropped its opposition.1 39
By this time, however, the Department of Transportation real-
ized that it would have to backtrack. It issued a statement of
clarification concerning the NPRM stating that any delegation
of authority to foreigners to make decisions concerning com-
mercial aspects of a U.S. airline would have to be revocable. 140
In issuing the NPRM initially, the Department of Transportation
spoke of its potential for increasing foreign investment in U.S.
airlines. 4 ' For potential foreign investors, however, a delega-
tion of foreign control of commercial activities that could be
easily revoked could hardly be expected to favorably affect their
investment decisions. In any case, the statement of clarification
135 Jay Boehmer, Alliances Push Antitrust Immunity, Expanded Transatlantic Coop-
eration, Bus. TRAVEL NEWS ONLINE, July 23, 2007, available at http://www.btnon
line.com/businesstravelnews/headlines/frontpage-display.jsg?vnv-contentid=
1003612895.
136 Marilyn Adams, Protectionism Door Threatens to Slam on Open Skies, U.S. TODAY,
Mar. 29, 2006, available at http://www.U.S.today.com/money/biztravel/2006-03-
29-open-skies-threatenedx.htm.
137 Roundtable Discussion on Competition issues in the Allocation of Airport
Take-off, Landing Slots and Ground Handling Services 5 (June 16, 1997) (note
by the United States for discussion), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/us
subs.shtm.
138 Joanna Walters, BA Buys Up Heathrow Slots, OBSERVER, Apr. 21, 2002, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2002/apr/21/theairlineindustry.theobserver.
139 Suzy Jagger & David Robertson, Continental's $209m Heathrow Slots, TIMES
ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/busi-
ness/industrysecrets/transport/article3480029.ece.
140 Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,425, 26,425, 26,430,
26,431 (supplemented May 5, 2006) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 204 & 399 (2007)).
For detailed explanation of this, see Statement of Jeffrey N. Shane, Under Secre-
tary of Transportation for Policy, Dep't of Transp. before the Subcomm. on Avia-
tion on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, May 9, 2006.
14, Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. at 67,392.
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did little to mollify political opposition to the NPRM, thus
shortly after the election of a Democratic majority in both
houses of Congress in the mid-term elections of November
2006, the Department of Transportation in December withdrew
the NPRM. 142
Even though the E.U. Transport Ministers had said that
changes in U.S. foreign investment-and-control regulations were
essential to reaching agreement, in the end they approved an
agreement without them.143 The situation remained that no
more than twenty-five percent of the voting stock of a U.S. air-
line may be owned by foreigners, and any semblance of "actual
control" by foreigners is still prohibited. 44 Two-thirds of an air-
line's board must be U.S. citizens, and generally, the majority of
equity shares must be U.S.-owned. 145 The United States was able
to achieve its major goal in the negotiations-increased access
to Heathrow Airport through E.U. acceptance of open skies-
and, in the end, conceded little apart from recognition of E.U.
community carriers. 146
The agreement did deliver a new liberal regime that goes be-
yond anything that has existed previously except within the na-
tional domestic market and the E.U.'s regional market.
However, it falls far short of what the E.U. proposed, and, while
further stages of development are envisaged, what many see as
existing imbalances of benefits gained and opportunities still
sought will make further progress extremely difficult. From the
perspective of the Europeans, the United States now has cabo-
tage rights within the E.U. through what the United States sees
as fifth freedom rights between the member states (though one
should note that U.S. airlines do not use these fifth freedom
passenger rights). The attempt by the E.U. to gain what it saw as
comparable rights in the United States through a merging of
E.U. and U.S. cabotage, or through changes to U.S. ownership
and control laws, both failed. U.S. concessions on recognizing
142 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., U.S. Dep't of Transp. withdraws Int'l
Inv. Rule-Commits to Working on Open Skies Agreement (Dec. 5, 2006), http:/
/ www.dot.gov/affairs/dotl 10006.htm.
143 See generally Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-E.U., Apr. 27, 30, 2007, 46
I.L.M. 470, available at http://www.state.gov/pleur/n-jeu/c21824.htm [hereinaf-
ter Air Transport].
144 Id. annex 4, at art. 1.
145 Id. annex 4, at art. 3.
146 Press Release, U.S. Embassy London, Turbulent Times: Regulations, Sec. &
Profitability in the Airline Industry (Mar. 5, 2007), http://www.usembassy.org.
uk/ukpapress47.html.
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the concept of community carriers on cargo and seventh free-
dom rights (the right to commercial carriage between two states,
neither of which is the airline's country of origin),'147 and on
some modifications to the Fly America Program hardly balanced
the benefits it acquired through access to Heathrow and the
symbolic importance for U.S. officials of achieving an open-skies
regime for all of the E.U.
The British insisted on a provision in the Transport Agree-
ment stating that, in the "Stage 2" negotiations (which began in
May 2008), unless the United States agrees to changes in its poli-
cies regarding foreign ownership and control, the E.U. will have
the right to withdraw from the agreement. 148 Under the timeta-
ble established for the "Stage 2" negotiations, the earliest sus-
pension of rights under the treaty could occur would be
summer of 2012."' Withdrawal from the treaty is highly un-
likely, however, because of the chaos this would bring to the
transatlantic and, potentially, the whole world aviation market.
Significant changes in U.S. foreign ownership-and-control
rules will be extremely difficult to effectuate in the foreseeable
future for political reasons. Successive administrations have at-
tempted to change the rules for decades without success. The
Democratic successes in the White House and Congress in 2008
have rendered the chances for changing the rules very low in-
deed for a variety of reasons including opposition from organ-
ized labor.150 Without a Republican Congress with which to
work, any president's chances of changing the rules would be
slim.
Perhaps the most likely trigger for change would be a finan-
cial crisis facing a U.S. airline that could be resolved only by its
purchase by a European airline. If there were the prospect of
large job losses in the absence of a foreign acquisition, then or-
ganized labor's usual objection to such an acquisition could be
muted. At today's fuel prices, many U.S. airlines are facing se-
147 Greg Farr, Globalization: US Airways on the World Stage, US AIRWAVES, Mar.
2000, at 32, http://cf.alpa.org/mec/aaa/docs/newmectoday/arc/airwaves/
aw003/leg0300.pdf.
148 Air Transport, supra note 143.
149 Id.
150 Brian Wilson, Union Influence Strong in Dem Primary, FoxNEWS, Sept. 4, 2003,
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,96098,00.html (reflecting un-
ions' traditional support of the Democratic party). See Interview with Jeffrey N.
Shane, supra note 39.
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vere financial challenges."' Some are almost certain to face
bankruptcy.'1 2 It is possible that out of these circumstances
could emerge an opportunity to change U.S. regulations on for-
eign ownership and control that would not otherwise be
possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since agreement was reached on the first phase of the E.U.-
U.S. aviation agreement, there have been a number of signifi-
cant developments. The industry continues to be troubled by
the worldwide economic slow-down and the dramatic rise in fuel
costs. According to IATA, twenty-four carriers have gone bank-
rupt or out of business15 with U.S. carriers alone heading for a
$5.2 billion loss in 2008.154 Among other things, this has en-
couraged further consolidation in the U.S. domestic market
with the merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines,'5 5 and Conti-
nental and United Airlines agreeing to a close alliance. 156 Fur-
thermore, cooperation and the strengthening of U.S.-E.U. based
airlines have been made specifically possible by the outcome of
the 2007 agreement. Antitrust immunity has been granted to
the alliance between AirFrance/KLM and Delta/Northwest air-
lines.1 57 That, along with the fact that Continental, Northwest,
Delta, and US Airways have all acquired slots at Heathrow, 1 5 has
made the long-desired immunized alliance between BA and AA
more likely. With more effective competitors now able to fly out
of Heathrow, fear of BA/AA dominating transatlantic routes is
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152 Id.
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diminished, and therefore, arguments against granting immu-
nity to their proposed alliance weakened. BA, AA and Iberia
have had negotiations for such an alliance. 15 9 Such develop-
ments might ease the difficulties of the major European and
American carriers and stave off dangers of financial collapse.
The consummation of an immunized alliance with Iberia and
AA might also ease BA's concerns about losing its privileged po-
sition at Heathrow, without getting what it saw in 2007 as com-
mensurate compensation in terms of better access to feeder and
distribution services in the United States. Such services might
now be possible via AA. If both these eventualities materialized,
they would reduce the pressure on the United States to move
forward to change ownership-and-control and open cabotage. If
they do not materialize, then pressures will remain, but whether
they would be forceful enough to bring change is doubtful.
At the end f the day, the United States was, and always has
been, only prepared to loosen the Gordian knot that tied sover-
eignty to the airline industry. In this sense, the United States
did not depart from its traditional policy in 2007. It favors a
more liberal and competitive market, but it is not prepared to
endanger what key political factions within the United States see
as an industry that has important national security aspects, nor
are powerful economic groups prepared, rightly or wrongly, to
endanger U.S. jobs through "unfair" competition from state-
owned carriers and foreign labor, which is paid less and has
lower standards for working conditions.
The vision that came out of the European Commission would
have cut the Gordian knot between national sovereignty and the
airline industry, and then temporarily re-tied it to a form of re-
gional sovereignty that embraced both the E.U. and the United
States. But this was with the hope of cutting the Gordian knot
yet again, so that all states could enter the OAA, thus creating a
truly globalized airline industry, where the Gordian knot would
no longer tie it to sovereignty but to universally agreed rules and
procedures of commercial intercourse. The market would de-
cide (except on the provision of subsidized services on social
welfare grounds) routes, rates, and capacity within a market-
place that had common establishment, competition, and safety
rules. There are ongoing follow-up negotiations between the
159 Martin Fellows, BA Seeking Alliance with American and Iberia Airlines, http://
news.carrentals.co.uk/ba-seeking-alliance-with-american-and-iberia-airlines-342
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E.U. and the United States, which began in the summer of 2008,
but whether the vision of a single market embracing the E.U.
and the United States will be realized depends largely on politi-
cal forces in the United States. At the time of this writing, much
is in flux with changing configurations in ownership and alli-
ances, and continued buffeting of the economics of the indus-
try, but whatever emerges at the end of the day, there is a huge
domestic hill to climb before the United States can reclaim its
leadership of deregulation and liberalization in the interna-
tional civil aviation market. And, until it does, further globaliza-
tion of the market can only proceed, if at all, incrementally and
elsewhere.
